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Abstract
What does it mean that something is probably obligatory? And how does it relate to the
probability that it is permitted or prohibited? In this paper, we provide a possible answer by
merging deontic argumentation and probabilistic argumentation into a probabilistic deontic
argumentation framework. This framework allows us to specify a semantics for the probability
of deontic statuses. The deontic argumentation part builds on standard concepts from the study
of computational models of argument: rule-based arguments, argumentation graphs, argument
labelling semantics and statement labelling semantics. We then encapsulate this deontic
composition with the approach of probabilistic labellings to probabilistic argumentation, in
order to associate deontic statements with probability values. The framework is illustrated
with a scenario featuring a violation and a contrary-to-duty obligation.
Keywords: Probabilistic argumentation, deontic argumentation.
1. Introduction
Research in the area of argumentation investigates how conclusions can be drawn from a
set of conflicting arguments and how such arguments can be constructed from an inconsistent
and incomplete knowledge base. Argumentation has become a well-established approach to
defeasible reasoning by virtue of its perceived simplicity and explanatory power. Because of
its logic-based underpinnings, argumentation theory has traditionally approached uncertainty
from a qualitative perspective. However, recent work has begun integrating probabilistic
quantitative aspects into the argumentation process, see e.g. [1, 2, 3]. Typically, arguments
are associated with probability values, and quantitative relationships amongst these argu-
ments are studied to add a probabilistic dimension to defeasible reasoning as addressed by
argumentation.
It has long been recognised that normative and deontic reasoning is defeasible [4] or non-
monotonic [5]. Capturing such reasoning within an argumentative context could – potentially
– provide an enhanced understanding of it and foster useful applications, and consequently,
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normative or deontic argumentation frameworks have attracted increasing attention, see
e.g. [6, 7, 8, 9].
Integrating probabilistic uncertainty into deontic argument-based reasoning may be useful
for various applications. For example, a probabilistic deontic argumentation framework may
provide semantics for legal expert systems associating normative effects with probability
measures. It may also be useful to norm-governed cyber-physical systems where sensors
provide uncertain readings as to the state of the environment, and probability measures are
attached to system’s normative states. Multiple applications can be conceived.
In general, probabilistic reasoning upon deontic concepts is important for systems where
norm-related statements have an associated probabilistic uncertainty. As a running example,
we will consider the following simple scenario (a follow-up from [9], inspired by the Hart-
Fuller debate [10, 11]).
Example 1. Vehicles are prohibited from entering a park unless there is an emergency. At
some point, sensors suggest that a vehicle has entered the park, while other sensors indicate
that an emergency situation may be occurring. Given this situation, we then seek to compute
the likelihood that the prohibition is violated; doing so would allow us — for example — to
decide whether to dispatch a law enforcement agent to the park or not.
In the example above, probabilities are associated with the facts matching the antecedents of
conditional norms, a prohibition and an exception to it, and one is interested in the probability
that the prohibition is complied with or violated. In turn, such measures can then be used to
obtain descriptive or predictive insights into the system. If no proper probabilistic framework
is adopted, then outcomes and uncertainty measures may be inconsistent or incoherent.
In this paper we take a first step in combining probability theory and deontic argumentation,
investigating how probabilistic argumentation can be coupled with normative and deontic
reasoning. Our approach builds on the notion of probabilistic labellings [3] and we show how
such labellings can be applied to the types of deontic argumentation frameworks described in
[9] where pieces of doctrine are expressed within defeasible theories.
The combination of deontic and probabilistic notions is certainly not new, and there
exist various works where probabilistic concepts are used to capture different aspects of
normative notions. In the utilitarian tradition, for example, an action is considered obligatory
if it has the highest expected aggregate utility when compared to the available alternatives,
and this view has influenced fields as diverse as ethics, law, and economics. Our focus
here is different: we concentrate on normative conclusions, i.e. on the normative statuses
(unconditional obligations, permissions, or other normative properties) that are established by
a given set of norms. We seek to determine how likely it is that such normative statuses are
triggered by facts matching the antecedents of conditional norms. With regard to obligations
or prohibitions we also examine how likely it is that they are violated or rather complied with.
In this work we ignore dynamic and practical aspects of normative reasoning, considering
only how uncertain knowledge impacts on normative concepts. In other words, we consider
only epistemic issues, ignoring, for example, how to select specific actions to pursue by
utilising probabilistic argumentation [12]. We believe that determining the likelihood of
normative statuses is an important subject on its own, and intend to investigate the links with
— for example — practical decision making as part of future work.
Our work builds on probabilistic argumentation, which has been applied to several aspects
of legal and normative domains. For example, probability theory has been combined with
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argument and scenario approaches to evidential reasoning [1]. In another line of work, early
probabilistic argumentation frameworks (see e.g. [13]) were used together with game theory
to identify optimal strategies in dialogue games [14]. More recent research has coupled
probabilistic argumentation with reinforcement learning to determine what actions to perform
in environments featuring basic conditional obligations [12]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, probabilistic argumentation has never been integrated with any proper deontic
argumentation framework, and it is precisely this gap we seek to address in the work reported
here.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we outline a
labelling-based approach to probabilistic argumentation and describe its semantics. In Section
3 we describe how probabilistic labellings can be used to reason about deontic concepts.
Section 4 provides a detailed example of our approach, after which we conclude.
2. Probabilistic Argumentation Framework
In this section we present a simple ASPIC-like argumentation system (cf. e.g. [15, 16])
and its probabilistic development [3]. We begin by defining the language for expressing rules,
and then describe how arguments, attack and support relations can be constructed. Given a set
of arguments, we identify which are accepted, and in turn which statements are acceptable.
Acceptance is specified through labellings, which are then integrated into a probabilistic
setting.
2.1. Language
Our language is propositional, with literals being constructed from propositions, negations
of propositions, and modal operators (which are used later to capture deontic modalities).
Definition 2.1. A literal statement is either a plain literal statement or a modal literal
statement, where
• a plain literal statement is either an atomic proposition p or the negation of an atomic
proposition (i.e. ¬p) and
• a modal literal statement is a statement of the formγ or¬γ , such that is a placeholder
for any modal operator and γ is a plain literal statement.
Notation 2.1. For notational convenience we write the complement of a literal statement γ
as γ . That is, if γ is of the form p, then γ is ¬p, while if γ is ¬p, then γ is p.
Defeasible rules constructed using literals represent conditionals of the form ‘if . . . then
. . . unless . . . ’. While many argumentation formalisms distinguish between strict and defeasi-
ble rules, for simplicity we consider only defeasible rules in this work1.
Definition 2.2. A defeasible rule over a set of literal statements S is a construct of the form:
r : ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,∼ ϕ ′1, . . . ,∼ ϕ ′m⇒ ϕ
1The translation of our results to strict rules can be achieved relatively simply through techniques similar to those
proposed by Li and Parsons [17].
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where 0≤ n and 0≤m, r is a unique identifier for the rule, while for any 0≤ i≤ n, 0≤ j≤m,
ϕi,ϕ
′
j,ϕ ∈S are all literal statements.
A rule r : ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,∼ ϕ ′1, . . . ,∼ ϕ ′m⇒ ϕ can be read as follows: “if ϕ1 and . . . and ϕn
are supported, and all of ϕ ′1, . . ., ϕ
′
m are not supported, then ϕ is defeasibly supported. While
premises prefixed with ∼ can be interpreted as a form of negation as failure, we view such
premises as exceptions to the (default) application of the rule.
Notation 2.2. Let r be a defeasible rule r as in Definition 2.2, and Rules a set of rules.
• Body(r) denotes the body of r, i.e. Body(r) = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,∼ ϕ ′1, . . . ,∼ ϕ ′m}.
• Head(r) denotes the head of r, i.e. Head(r) = {ϕ}.
• Prop(r) denotes the set of propositions of r, i.e. Prop(r) = {p | p,¬p,∼ p,∼
¬p,p,¬p,¬p,¬¬p,∼p,∼ ¬p,∼¬p,∼ ¬¬p ∈ Body(r)∪Head(r)}.
• Prop(Rules) denotes the set of propositions of Rules, i.e. Prop(Rules) =
⋃
r∈Rules Prop(r).
Certain sets of literals are mutually inconsistent. In other words, they conflict, or are
incompatible with each other. Perhaps the simplest form of such a conflict is between a
proposition and its negation, but more complex conflicts can also exist. As done in many
other systems [18, 15], we introduce an abstract conflict relation to encode incompatibilities
between literal statements.
Definition 2.3. A conflict relation ‘Conflicts’ over a set of literal statements S is a binary
relation over S , i.e. Conflicts⊆S ×S .
Notation 2.3. We write Prop(Conflicts) to denote the propositions found within a conflict
relation, i.e. Prop(Conflicts) = {p | (ϕ,ϕ ′) ∈ Conflicts : ϕ = p,¬p,p,¬p, ¬p,¬¬p,
or ϕ ′ = p,¬p,p,¬p,¬p,¬¬p}.
The conflict relation should adhere to certain principles, in which case it is said to be
well-formed. For example, for a purely propositional system, it should be the case that
Conflicts(γ,γ). For a deontic setting, we will specify the requirements for the conflict relation
in Section 3. Note that the conflict relation can be asymmetric or symmetric to capture, for
example, contrary or contradictory relationships [15], but we do not consider such aspects
here.
Preferences over rules are commonly used to resolve conflicts. We capture such prefer-
ences via a superiority relation  over rules. Informally, s r means that rule s prevails over
rule r.
Definition 2.4. A superiority relation  over a set of rules Rules is an asymmetric binary
relation over Rules, i.e. ⊆ Rules×Rules.
As the superiority relation is asymmetric, for any rule r it is not the case that r  r, and for
two distinct rules r and r′ we cannot have both r  r′ and r′  r.
2.2. Defeasible theories and argumentation graphs
Having introduced rules, conflicts between literal statements and superiority relationships
between rules, we now turn our attention to how rules can be combined to build arguments.
Given that these arguments may conflict, we describe later how sets of accepted arguments
can be identified.
A defeasible theory lists a set of rules, a conflict relation and a superiority relation. Such a
defeasible theory forms the basic structure over which inferences can take place.
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Definition 2.5. A defeasible theory is a tuple 〈Rules,Conflicts,〉 where
• Rules is a set of rules, and
• Conflicts is a conflict relation, and
•  is a superiority relation over Rules.
Notation 2.4. Given a defeasible theory T = 〈Rules,Conflicts,〉,
• Rules(T ), Conflicts(T ), and (T ) denote the set of rules Rules, the relation Conflicts, and
the relation  of theory T respectively,
• Prop(T ) denotes the set of propositions of T , i.e. Prop(T ) = Prop(Rules)∪Prop(Conflicts).
Inferences over a defeasible theory are performed by chaining its defeasible rules to form
arguments, which we define below. Our definition of arguments is inspired by, and similar
to, those used in other rule-based argumentation frameworks, as described for example in
[15, 16, 19].
Definition 2.6. An argument A constructed from a defeasible theory 〈Rules,Con f licts,〉
is a finite construct of the form:
A : A1, . . . ,An,∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm⇒r ϕ
with 0≤ n and 0≤ m, and where
• A is the unique identifier of the argument;
• ϕ is the conclusion of the argument, denoted con(A);
• A1, . . . ,An are arguments constructed from the defeasible theory 〈Rules,Con f licts,〉;
• r ∈ Rules is the top rule of the argument, and it is of the form r : con(A1), . . . ,con(An),∼
ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm⇒ ϕ .
Notation 2.5. Given an argument A as in Definition 2.6, we use the following notations.
• Sub(A) denotes the set of subarguments of A, i.e. Sub(A) = Sub(A1)∪ . . .∪Sub(An)∪{A}.
• DirectSub(A) denotes the direct subarguments of A, i.e. DirectSub(A) = {A1, . . . ,An}.
• TopRule(A) denotes the top rule of A, i.e. TopRule(A) = (r : con(A1), . . . ,con(An), ∼
ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm⇒ ϕ).
• Rules(A) denotes the rules used within A, i.e. Rules(A) = Rules(A1)∪ . . .∪Rules(An)∪
{TopRule(A)}.
We can remark that Definition 2.6 assumes that arguments are finite, i.e. any argument
has a finite set of subarguments. Accordingly, any argument has exactly one conclusion and
‘bottoms out’ in arguments with an empy set of subarguments (taking the form A :∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼
ϕm⇒ ϕ with 0≤ m). Nevertheless, for a given defeasible theory, we may have an infinite
number of finite arguments.
Different types of inconsistencies can appear between arguments, causing them to attack
each other. We consider two types of attacks between arguments: rebuttals (where two
argument’s conclusions are incompatible), and undercuts2 (where exceptions prevent an
argument’s conclusion from being drawn). In the ASPIC family of argumentation frameworks,
attack is differentiated from defeat, with the latter taking preferences between arguments into
account. For simplicity, we make no such distinction in this work, instead integrating such
2Note that this term is overloaded in the argumentation literature, and is used with different meanings in different
contexts [15].
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preferences into our definition of attack. While diverse approaches to lifting preferences over
rules to preferences over arguments have been described [6], in this work we utilise a simple
last-link ordering [15] to compute preferences over arguments. More specifically, argument A
is preferred to argument B (written A B) iff TopRule(A) TopRule(B).
Definition 2.7.
• An attack relation  over a set of arguments A is a binary relation over A , i.e.  ⊆
A ×A .
• Let A and B be two arguments constructed from a defeasible theory 〈Rules,Conflicts,〉,
argument A attacks B, i.e. (A,B) ∈ , iff A rebuts or undercuts B, where
– A rebuts B (on B′) iff ∃B′ ∈ Sub(B) such that Conflicts(con(A),con(B′)), and B′ 6 A;
– A undercuts B (on B′) iff ∃B′ ∈ Sub(B) such that (∼ con(A)) ∈ Body(TopRule(B′)).
In what follows, it will be useful to identify which arguments are the immediate subar-
guments of other arguments, leading us to the following definition of direct subargument
relations.
Definition 2.8.
• A direct subargument relation Z⇒ over a set of arguments A is a binary relation over A ,
i.e. Z⇒⊆A ×A .
• Let A and B be two arguments constructed from a defeasible theory, argument B is a direct
subargument of A, written B Z⇒ A, iff B belongs to the set of direct subarguments of A, i.e.
B ∈ DirectSub(A).
Since an argument is not a direct subargument of itself and cannot be a subargument of
its direct subarguments, the direct subargument relation over arguments constructed from a
defeasible theory is antireflexive and acyclic. In the remainder of this work, for the sake of
simplicity, we say that an argument A supports an argument B if A is a direct subargument of
B. We note that other notions of support may be considered, but leave them to future work.
Given the arguments and attacks obtained from a defeasible theory, and by making
use of the subargument relation, we can create an argumentation graph as defined below,
cf. [20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
Definition 2.9. An argumentation graph constructed from a defeasible theory T is a tuple
〈A , , Z⇒〉 where A is the set of all arguments constructed from T , is an attack relation
over A , and Z⇒ is a direct subargument relation over A .
In the rest of the paper, we assume that all argumentation graphs are constructed from a
defeasible theory, which may be left unspecified.
As to the terminology, an argumentation graph may be called a bipolar argumentation
graph/framework [21], as long as the support relation is understood as a (direct) subargument
relation, every argument has a conclusion which is a statement, and such bipolar graphs enjoy
all the (probabilistic) characteristics and properties discussed in the remainder of this work.
Notation 2.6. Given an argumentation graph G = 〈A , , Z⇒〉, we may write AG, G and
Z⇒G to denote the graph’s arguments A , attacks and subargument relation Z⇒ respectively.
Example 2. An argumentation graph is illustrated in Figure 1, with solid arrows denoting
attacks and hollow arrows representing supports. From our definitions, arguments A and B




Figure 1: An argumentation graph. Arguments A and B support argument C. Argument C attacks D. Arguments D
and E attack each other.

We note that given an argumentation graph G constructed from a defeasible theory T ,
since AG is the set of all arguments constructed from T then the relations G and Z⇒G of
the graph are defined over AG. Hence G is obtained according to Definition 2.7, and Z⇒G
complies with specification of Definition 2.8 on direct subargument relations.
Given an argumentation graph, we may wish to determine what conclusions can be
drawn if some arguments are omitted. We may therefore wish to deal with subgraphs of an
argumentation graph.
Definition 2.10. Let G denote an argumentation graph. The subgraph H of G in-
duced by a set of arguments AH ⊆ AG is an argumentation graph such that H =
〈AH , G ∩(AH ×AH), Z⇒G ∩(AH ×AH)〉.
Notation 2.7. Given an argumentation graph G, we denote all of its subgraphs as Sub(G),
i.e. Sub(G) = {〈AH , G ∩(AH ×AH), Z⇒G ∩(AH ×AH)〉 |AH ⊆AG}.
Clearly, if an argument A appears within an argumentation graph, then any subgraph should
contain not only A, but also A’s subarguments and any attacks related to these subarguments.
Graphs obeying this property are said to be subargument-complete.
Definition 2.11. A subgraph H of an argumentation graph G induced by a set of arguments
AH is subargument-complete iff for every argument A ∈AH , if B Z⇒G A then B ∈AH .
Example 2 (continued). The argumentation graphs in Figures 2 (a) and (b) are subgraphs of
the argumentation graph in Figure 1, and they are induced by the set of arguments {A,B,C,D}
and {A,C,D} respectively. The graph of Figure 2 (a) is a subargument-complete subgraph,





Figure 2: Two subgraphs of the argumentation graph from Figure 1.

Through the definitions above, given a defeasible theory we are able to build arguments
and identify attacks and subarguments across arguments, from which we can construct
an argumentation graph. Next, we consider how the acceptance status of arguments and
statements can be determined through the use of labellings.
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2.3. Argument labelling
Given an argumentation graph, the selection of arguments considered acceptable or
justified is performed on the basis of a formal specification traditionally called argumentation
semantics. This evaluation can be carried out in terms of sets of arguments called extensions
[25], or in terms of labellings [26]. For our purposes, we adopt the labelling approach.
Argument labelling approaches usually assign one of three labels (IN,OUT and UND)
to arguments, reflecting their acceptance status with respect to a specific argumentation
semantics. We extend such labellings to consider whether an argument is, or is not included
when evaluating acceptance by introducing an additional OFF label. The addition of this
label will allow us to distinguish between the probability of using an argument as part of the
construction of an argumentation graph, and the probability of its acceptance.
Argument labellings are commonly formalised as follows.
Definition 2.12. Let G be an argumentation graph, and ArgLab a set of labels for arguments.
An ArgLab-labelling of a set of arguments A ⊆AG is a total function L : A → ArgLab.
While argument labellings map sets of arguments to a label, we will abuse notation and
may speak of the labelling of an argument. Labellings involving all the arguments of an
argumentation graph play a special role and deserve a specific terminology and notation.
Definition 2.13. Let ArgLab be a set of labels for arguments. An ArgLab-labelling of an
argument graph G is a total function L : AG→ ArgLab.
Notation 2.8.
• We write LArgLab(A ) to denote the universe of all possible ArgLab-labelling assignments to
a set of arguments A , and we write LArgLab(G) for the set of all possible ArgLab-labellings
of an argumentation graph G.
• If a labelling L assigns the label l to a set of arguments A, we may write l(L). In other words,
l(L) = {A | L(A) = l}. Thus for example, if IN is a label, then IN(L) = {A | L(A) = IN}.
As mentioned above, standard argument labellings make use of {IN,OUT,UND}-labellings.
Here, each argument is associated with a label representing its status with regards to an
argumentation semantics [26]. Intuitively, an IN labelling means that the argument is accepted,
while an OUT labelling indicates its rejection. An UND labelling states that the status of an
argument is undecided, i.e. it is neither accepted nor rejected. Different labelling functions
may label arguments in different ways, and a single labelling function may label the same
graph in multiple ways. In this work, we focus on complete labellings and from these, adopt
grounded labellings.
Definition 2.14. A complete {IN, OUT,UND}-labelling of an argumentation graph G is a
{IN,OUT,UND}-labelling such that for every argument A in AG:
• A is labelled IN if, and only if, all attackers of A are labelled OUT, and
• A is labelled OUT if, and only if, A has an attacker labelled IN.
Definition 2.15. A grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling L of an argumentation graph G is
a complete {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling of G such that IN(L) is minimal (with respect to set
inclusion) among all complete {IN,OUT,UND}-labellings of G.
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Example 2 (continued). The grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling of the argumentation graph





Figure 3: Argumentation graph and its grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling.

For any argumentation graph, the grounded labelling of the graph exists and is unique.
Moreover, for any finite argumentation graph, it can be computed in polynomial time using
for example Algorithm 1 [27]. The algorithm begins by labelling IN all arguments not being
attacked or whose attackers are OUT (line 4), and then it iteratively labels OUT any argument
attacked by an argument labelled IN (line 5). The iteration continues until no more arguments
can be labelled IN or OUT (line 6); and it terminates by labelling UND all unlabelled arguments
(line 7).
Algorithm 1 Computation of a grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling.
1: input A finite argumentation graph G,
2: L0 = 〈 /0, /0, /0〉,
3: repeat
4: IN(Li+1)← IN(Li)∪{A | A ∈ AG is not labelled in Li, and ∀B ∈ AG : if B attacks A
then B ∈ OUT(Li)}
5: OUT(Li+1)← OUT(Li)∪{A | A ∈AG is not labelled in Li, and ∃B ∈AG : B attacks A
and B ∈ IN(Li+1)}
6: until Li = Li+1
7: return 〈 IN(Li),OUT(Li),AG\(IN(Li)∪OUT(Li))〉
We can extend the grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling semantics through the introduction
of an OFF label. Intuitively, OFF labelled arguments are not evaluated when computing
argument acceptance.
Definition 2.16. Let H be a subargument-complete subgraph of an argumentation graph
G. A grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of G with respect to H is a {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-
labelling of G such that:
• every argument in AH is labelled according to the grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling of H,
and
• every argument in AG\AH is labelled OFF.
An argumentation graph G has a unique grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling, but it has as
many grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings as there are subargument-complete subgraphs
of G.
Example 2 (continued). A grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of the argumentation






Figure 4: A grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling.

Argument labellings which are equivalent to an argumentation semantics are also called
argument acceptance labellings. Given a set of labels from a set of argument acceptance
labellings, one can compute justification statuses for arguments to obtain an argument justi-
fication labelling. From an argument justification labelling, individual statements can then
be labelled, yielding a statement justification labelling. However, one can also directly label
statements from argument acceptance labellings, and it is this latter approach the one we use
in this paper.
2.4. Statement labelling
Given a set of statements, a statement labelling of this set is a (preferably total) function
associating any statement with a label. Different specifications for statement labellings are
possible [28, 29], but for our purposes, we consider what is perhaps the simplest meaningful
labelling, namely the bivalent labelling semantics. Under this labelling, a statement is either
accepted or not accepted. If accepted, then the statement is labelled ‘in’, otherwise it is
labelled ‘ni’.
As statements are labelled via argument acceptance labellings, the resultant statement
labellings are acceptance bivalent {in,ni}-labellings, but we may simply call them bivalent
{in,ni}-labellings.
Definition 2.17. Let L be a set of {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings, S a set of literal statements.
A bivalent {in,ni}-labelling of S from L is a total function K : L,S →{in,ni} such that for
any argument labelling L ∈ L and any statement ϕ ∈S :
• K(L,ϕ) = in iff IN ∈ {L(A) | con(A) = ϕ}, and
• K(L,ϕ) = ni otherwise.
Bivalent labellings cannot differentiate between a statement being deemed unjustified
and undecidable (the latter by being the conclusion of UND labelled arguments). Trivalent
labellings [28] are a simple extension of bivalent labellings which include undecidability.
Definition 2.18. Let L be a set of {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings, S a set of literal state-
ments. A trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and L is a total function K : L,S →
{in,und,niund} such that for any argument labelling L ∈ L and any statement ϕ ∈S :
• K(L,ϕ) = in iff IN ∈ {L(A) | con(A) = ϕ}, and
• K(L,ϕ) = und iff UND ∈ {L(A) | con(A) = ϕ} and IN /∈ {L(A) | con(A) = ϕ}, and
• K(L,ϕ) = niund otherwise.
Notation 2.9. A bivalent {in,ni}-labelling or trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling K may be
represented as a tuple 〈in(K),ni(K)〉 or 〈in(K),und(K),niund(K)〉 respectively, with the
obvious meaning.
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The distinction between bivalent and trivalent labellings is later exploited in our deontic
setting. For now we note the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Let L be a grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation
graph constructed from a defeasible theory T , S a set of literal statements.
• Let K be a bivalent {in,ni}-labelling of S and from {L}. For any statement ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈S ,
such that (ϕ1,ϕ2) ∈ Conflicts(T ), if K(L,ϕ1) = in then K(L,ϕ2) = ni.
• Let K be a trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from {L}. For any statement
ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈S , such that (ϕ1,ϕ2) ∈ Conflicts(T ), if K(L,ϕ1) = in then K(L,ϕ2) = niund.
This proposition is used to show later some results in our probabilistic deontic investigation.
2.5. Probabilistic labellings
To extend our work to the probabilistic setting we take the approach of probabilistic
labellings according to which, given an argumentation graph, specific sets of argument
labellings are sample spaces [3]. For our purposes, we will focus on grounded labellings and
thus we will work with so-called grounded probabilistic labelling frames.
Definition 2.19. A grounded probabilistic labelling frame (or grounded PLF) based on an
argumentation graph G is a tuple 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 where 〈Ω,F ,P〉 is a probability space such
that:
• the sample space Ω is the set of grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings of G;
• the σ -algebra F is the power set of Ω, i.e. F = 2Ω;
• the function P from F to [0,1] is a probability measure (or probability distribution) satisfy-
ing Kolmogorov axioms.
Example 2 (continued). Let us consider the grounded PLF based on the argumentation graph
given in Figure 1 along with a uniform probability distribution. The sample space and the
distribution are illustrated in Figure 5.
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A grounded PLF defines a probability space, and thus we can work with random variables
(written using upper case letters such as X ,Y or Z) from Ω to another set of elements.
Therefore, we introduce a categorical random variable, which we refer to as a random
labelling. The random labelling for an argument A, denoted LA maps from Ω to the set of
labels {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}. We may write, for example, LA = IN as shorthand for the outcomes
{L ∈Ω | L(A) = IN} (i.e. capturing those outcomes where A is labelled IN). We can follow a
similar approach to the labelling of statements. That is, for any statement ϕ , we can introduce
a categorical random variable Kϕ which maps Ω to the set of labels {in,ni} or {in,und,niund}
(depending on whether we consider bivalent or trivalent labellings). Hence, P(Kϕ = l) = 1,
for example, is interpreted as ‘the probability that statement ϕ is labelled l equals one’, while
P(Kϕ ′ = l′ |Kϕ = l) = 1 is interpreted as ‘the probability that statement ϕ ′ is labelled l′, given
that statement ϕ is labelled l, equals one’. In the remainder of this paper, we assume that
all specified conditional probabilities are not undefined (a conditional probability P(A | B) is
undefined if P(B) = 0).
Example 2 (continued). Referring to the probability distribution in Figure 5, we can easily
compute that, for example, P(LA = IN) = 12/20, P(LA = OFF) = 8/20 or P(LE = IN | LD =
OUT) = 1/2. 
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A B C D E P(·)
IN IN IN OUT IN 1/20
IN IN IN OUT OFF 1/20
IN IN IN OFF IN 1/20
IN IN IN OFF OFF 1/20
IN IN OFF UND UND 1/20
IN IN OFF IN OFF 1/20
IN IN OFF OFF IN 1/20
IN IN OFF OFF OFF 1/20
IN OFF OFF UND UND 1/20
IN OFF OFF IN OFF 1/20
IN OFF OFF OFF IN 1/20
IN OFF OFF OFF OFF 1/20
OFF IN OFF UND UND 1/20
OFF IN OFF IN OFF 1/20
OFF IN OFF OFF IN 1/20
OFF IN OFF OFF OFF 1/20
OFF OFF OFF UND UND 1/20
OFF OFF OFF IN OFF 1/20
OFF OFF OFF OFF IN 1/20
OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF 1/20
Figure 5: Sample space and probability distribution.
This probabilistic argumentation framework has multiple properties, see [3] for some of
them. For our purposes, let us consider the following proposition and corollary.
Proposition 2.2. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a grounded PLF. Let L denote any grounded {IN,OUT,
UND,OFF}-labelling such that L ∈Ω, S a set of literal statements, and K a bivalent {in,ni}-
labelling or trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from {L}. For any ϕ,ϕ ′ ∈S such
that if K(L,ϕ) = l then K(L,ϕ ′) = l′,
P(Kϕ ′ = l′ | Kϕ = l) = 1.
Corollary 2.1. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a grounded PLF. Let L denote any grounded {IN,OUT,
UND,OFF}-labelling such that L ∈Ω, S a set of literal statements, and K a bivalent {in,ni}-
labelling or trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from {L}. For any ϕ,ϕ ′ ∈S such
that if K(L,ϕ) = l then K(L,ϕ ′) = l′,
P(Kϕ = l)≤ P(Kϕ ′ = l′).
We will also use the proposition and corollary below [3] when later studying the proba-
bilistic relationships amongst deontic statements.
Proposition 2.3. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a grounded PLF where G is constructed from a
defeasible theory T = 〈Rules,Conflicts,〉, S a set of literal statements. For any ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈S
such that Conflicts(ϕ1,ϕ2),
P(Kϕ1 = in)+P(Kϕ2 = in)≤ 1.
Corollary 2.2. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a grounded PLF where G is constructed from a defeasi-
ble theory T = 〈Rules,Conflicts,〉, S a set of literal statements. For any ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈S such
that Conflicts(ϕ1,ϕ2),
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P(Kϕ1 = in)≤ P(Kϕ2 6= in)
where
• P(Kϕ2 6= in) = P(Kϕ2 = ni) in the case of bivalent {in,ni}-labellings;
• P(Kϕ2 6= in) = P(Kϕ2 = und)+P(Kϕ2 = niund) in the case of trivalent {in,und,niund}-
labellings.
These properties of the framework are used later to obtain probabilistic results in our deontic
investigation.
The ‘source’ and interpretation of probability values can be diverse. In a classical approach
for example, one may simply assume that all the possible outcomes are equally possible and
thus that they should share the same probability value (as illustrated in Example 2 above).
Alternatively, in a frequentist interpretation, the probability of any event is the frequency
of occurrences of the event in a collection of outcomes. Clearly, there are various ways to
associate an event with probability values and to interpret these probabilities. In this paper,
we assume that probability distributions are simply given a priori.
This probabilistic argumentation framework subsumes, or can be related to, a number of
existing approaches to probabilistic argumentation [3], and consequently it can be applied to
various investigations in the legal domain, such as game-theoretical investigations of optimal
strategies in dialogue games [14]. It can also be used in machine learning endeavours, such as
structure learning [30, 31] or combinations of probabilistic argumentation with reinforcement
learning to determine actions to pursue in environments featuring basic conditional obligations
[12, 32]. In the remainder of the paper, we consider how deontic concepts can be represented
and reasoned about by exploiting probabilistic labellings.
To recap, we described a propositional language with modal operators, which — in the
next section — will be instantiated into deontic modalities. We have also described the syntax
of defeasible rules, and how such rules can be combined to form arguments. We introduced a
labelling approach to argument semantics, from which the acceptance status of statements can
be computed. Finally, we described how uncertainty and probability values can be associated
with arguments and statements within our system.
3. Probabilistic Deontic Argumentation
Having laid out a simple probabilistic rule-based argumentation system, we can now
specify a deontic version of it. To do so, we adopt the deontic argumentation framework of
[9] and develop it within our probabilistic setting.
3.1. Deontic language
In law and moral reasoning multiple normative concepts occur. We do not propose to
consider all these concepts, but rather focus on three basic deontic notions, namely obligations,
prohibitions, and permissions.
We assume that such deontic operators are interdefinable: the prohibition of something is
the obligation of its opposite, and the permission of something is the negation of its prohibition.
Therefore, we focus on a single deontic obligation operator O, and accordingly, we assume a
language LD whose literal statements are defined as follows, cf. Definition 2.1.
Definition 3.1. A literal statement of a language LD is either a plain literal statement or a
deontic literal statement, where:
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• a plain literal statement is either an atomic proposition p or the negation of an atomic
proposition, i.e. ¬p, and
• a deontic literal statement is a statement of the form Oγ or ¬Oγ such that γ is a plain
literal statement.
As indicated above, prohibitions and permissions are captured by assuming that a prohibi-
tion on something (Fγ) is equivalently expressed by the obligation of its opposite (Oγ), and a
permission for something (Pγ) is equivalent to the negation of the obligation of the opposite
(¬Oγ).
Notation 3.1. As syntactic sugar, we may write Oγ as Fγ , and ¬Oγ as Pγ .
A normative system may not be complete, i.e. it may not regulate every possible state of
affairs. This means that the system does not specify, for every state of affairs, whether that
state is obligatory, prohibited or permitted: there may be gaps, namely states of affairs for
which no deontic position is specified. In our model, we only consider those states of affairs
that are described by plain literals. Thus, by normative completeness, we refer to the quality
of a normative system having deontic positions specified for all plain literals. We focus on
normative systems that are meant to be complete, and whose gaps are filled according to the
‘principle of prohibition’ (see [33] p.125).
The principle of prohibition can be formulated as follows: ‘everything that is not prohibited
is permitted’. Although the principle is rather clear at first sight, it may not be given a unique
interpretation. We can adopt a mere tautological reading, based on the above notational
convention according to which being permitted for something means not being obligatory of
the opposite, i.e. according to which Pγ is defined as ¬Oγ . Following this reading, we can
say that a normative system specifies that a state of affairs is permitted when it specifies that
there is no prohibition of it: the normative system states that γ is permitted, when it entails
that ¬Oγ . This reading does not add anything to the content of the concerned normative
system. In the absence of any norms specifying that ¬Oγ or that Oγ (in which case γ would
be permitted, assuming that obligation entails permission) the deontic status of γ remains
undetermined.
Here we adopt a different reading of the principle of prohibition, namely the reading
according to which everything is permitted unless it is prohibited. More precisely, according
to this reading, a normative system based on the principle of permission grants to a state of
affairs the status of being permitted whenever it does not grant to the same state of affairs the
status of being prohibited. Following this interpretation, the principle of prohibition is no
longer tautological. Rather, it becomes a normative principle included in a normative system,
which is used for its completion: every gap in the system based on the principle of permission
is closed by generating permissions.
We use the terms ‘strong permission’ and ‘weak permission’ to distinguish the permission
that is derived from a specific norm (whose consequent denies that a state of affair is prohibited,
or equivalently, permits it) from the permission that is obtained according to the general
principle of prohibition, or also, as we shall see, from the principle that whatever is obligatory
is permitted.
Note that our concept of a weak permission differs from the concept of a weak permission,
as characterised by G. H. von Wright [34], or C.E. Alchourrón and E. Bulygin [33]. For these
authors a weak permission does not derive from a normative specification (for example from
a permissive norm): it is an assertion about a normative system, namely, the assertion that the
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normative system does not entail a prohibition. On the contrary, we view a weak permission
as an additional normative specification, which is added to a normative system, according to
the principle of prohibition, whenever the normative system does not entail a corresponding
prohibition. Finally note that the distinction between strong and weak permissions is not
directly represented in our deontic language; this distinction depends in the way in which the
permission at issue has been derived, from an explicit permissive norm, or rather according to
the general principle of prohibition.
A defeasible rule can specify varied relationships amongst (deontic) literal statements of a
given language LD. Such rules are called normative defeasible rules.
Definition 3.2. Given a language LD, a normative defeasible rule is a defeasible rule over
a set of literal statements in LD.
For the sake of simplicity, norms potentially captured by ‘modalised rules’, e.g. rules of
the form O(r : ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,∼ ϕ ′1, . . . ,∼ ϕ ′m ⇒ ϕ), are not accounted for in this paper. Such
constructs and their meanings are left for future work.
Normative rules are partitioned into foreground rules and background rules. Foreground
rules provide substantive normative regulations for particular normative domains, while
background rules express general deontic principles underlying the normative system being
considered.
Foreground rules are domain-dependent, and represent primary norms such as constitutive
rules or regulative rules. The effect of a constitutive rule is to define a term as understood in a
given situation or to ‘create’ an institutional entity from a set of brute or institutional facts.
A regulative rule, on the other hand, determines the conditions (premises) when a ‘deontic’
effect (obligation, prohibition, permission) is in force. While constitutive and regulative
norms have been formally approached in various (and sometimes sophisticated) ways in the
literature [35], the distinction is simply addressed in the present system: the consequent of
the rule is a plain literal for constitutive rules, and a deontic literal for regulative rules. A
regulative rule whose head is a (strong) permission would typically be used to specify an
exception to a prohibition (as discussed by A. Ross [36]), but such a rule can also be used
to stress a permission and clarify its conditions without being an exception to any existing
prohibitions.
Background rules are domain-independent and apply to a whole legal system, or to broad
sections of it (e.g. it has often been argued that the principle of prohibition applies to criminal
law). They express general deontic assumptions. These background rules can be viewed as
defeasible rule schemata which are isomorphic to some pieces of very basic legal doctrines or
some axioms of a deontic system. Various background defeasible rules may be proposed, we
provide some examples of such rules below.
d γ : Oγ ⇒ Pγ An obligation Oγ implies a permission Pγ (cf. Axiom ‘D’ in deontic
logics),
p γ : ⇒ Pγ Anything is permitted prima facie.
k γ : ∼ Oγ⇒ Pγ Anything that is not prohibited is permitted.
These background rules can be employed to build arguments supporting permissions. These
arguments are successful as long as no corresponding prohibitions can be accepted. We
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recognise that such rules do not capture all possible deontic schemata, but note they are
relevant in many contexts.
Different sets of background rules result in systems with different behaviour. In this work,
we focus on two sets of background rules: {d γ,p γ} and {d γ,k γ}.
Definition 3.3. A set of background defeasible rule schemata B is
• a prima facie permissive set of background defeasible rule schemata iff B = {d γ,p γ};
• a Kelsenian permissive set of background defeasible rule schemata iff B = {d γ,k γ};
• a permissive set of background defeasible rule schemata iff B= {d γ,p γ} or B= {d γ,k γ}.
‘Prima facie permissive’ and ‘Kelsenian permissive’ sets of rules both indicate that
anything is defeasibly permitted. However, the Kelsenian permissive set may better reflect the
principle of prohibition as exposed by the legal theorist H. Kelsen (thus its name). For both
sets, we will see that such background rules are not enough to obtain normative completeness
when using bivalent labellings.
Whatever the set of background defeasible rules, we will ground the rules over a set of
propositions. For our purposes, we do so over the propositions of an input (domain-dependent)
defeasible theory to yield a set of background rules. Then background rules are combined
with the rules of the theory to obtain backgrounded rules.
Definition 3.4. A set of rules is a set of background rules with respect to a defeasible theory
T and a set of background defeasible rule schemata B, denoted BackRules(T,B), iff
• BackRules(T,B) = {d γ,d γ,p γ,p γ | γ ∈ Prop(T )} if B is a prima facie permissive set of
background defeasible rule schemata;
• BackRules(T,B) = {d γ,d γ,k γ,k γ | γ ∈ Prop(T )} if B is a Kelsenian permissive set of
background defeasible rule schemata.
Definition 3.5. A set of rules Rules is a backgrounded set of rules with respect to a defea-
sible theory T and a set of background defeasible rule schemata B iff Rules = Rules(T )∪
BackRules(T,B).
Example 3. Returning to our park example, let us assume the presence of a policy stating
that vehicles are prohibited from entering the park, unless there is an emergency. Let us
consider the following atoms and informal meanings.
vehi: a vehicle stays at the entrance of the park.
emer: there is an emergency.
enter: the vehicle enters into the park.
Accordingly, Fenter means that the vehicle is forbidden to enter into the park, and Penter
means that the vehicle is permitted to enter. Fvehi means that it is forbidden that a vehicle
stays at the entrance of the park, Pvehi means that it is permitted that the vehicle stays at the
park entrance, and so on.
The policy may be easily formalised by the foreground defeasible theory 〈{r}, /0, /0〉 where
r : vehi, ∼ emer⇒ Fenter
The Kelsenian permissive set of background rules with respect to theory 〈{r}, /0, /0}〉 includes
all the following rules.
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d vehi : Ovehi ⇒ Pvehi d ¬vehi : O¬vehi ⇒ P¬vehi
k vehi : ∼ Fvehi ⇒ Pvehi k ¬vehi : ∼ F¬vehi ⇒ P¬vehi
d emer : Oemer ⇒ Pemer d ¬emer : O¬emer ⇒ P¬emer
k emer : ∼ Femer ⇒ Pemer k ¬emer : ∼ F¬emer ⇒ P¬emer
d enter : Oenter ⇒ Penter d ¬enter : O¬enter ⇒ P¬enter
























Figure 6: Deontic square of compatibility relation.
Concerning conflicts, we have normative conflicts, and any normative conflict can be
a foreground conflict or a background conflict, cf. [9]. A normative conflict has the form
(γ,γ) or (Oγ,Oγ) or (¬Oγ,Oγ) or (Oγ,¬Oγ). The latter three types of conflict are deontic
conflicts, and they can be visualised in the deontic square drawn in Figure 6.
Definition 3.6. A normative conflict is a conflict of the form (γ,γ) or (Oγ,Oγ) or (¬Oγ,Oγ)
or (Oγ,¬Oγ).
For example, for any atomic proposition p, a conflict (Op,¬Op) is captured by the conflict
of the form (Oγ,¬Oγ) where γ = p. Similarly, a conflict (O¬p,¬O¬p) is captured by
(Oγ,¬Oγ) where γ = ¬p.
Foreground conflicts are normative conflicts. They are meant to be conflicts which are
specified in foreground theories (see Definition 3.11). However, such foreground conflicts
may be incomplete — some (intuitively desirable) conflicts may not be included in the
foreground relation. To ensure completeness of conflicts, we utilise background conflicts.
Background conflicts are domain-independent in normative reasoning, and a conflict relation
is backgrounded by such conflicts if, and only if, they are included in the conflict relation.
Definition 3.7. A set of conflicts is a set of background conflicts with respect
to a defeasible theory T , denoted BackConflicts(T ), iff BackConflicts(T ) =
{(γ,γ),(γ,γ),(Oγ,Oγ),(Oγ,Oγ),(Oγ,¬Oγ),(¬Oγ,Oγ),(Oγ,¬Oγ),(¬Oγ,Oγ) | γ ∈
Prop(T )}.
Definition 3.8. A conflict relation Con f licts is a backgrounded conflict relation with respect
to a defeasible theory T iff Con f licts = Conflicts(T )∪BackConflicts(T ).
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Given a defeasible theory T where any conflict in the relation Conflicts(T ) is a normative
conflict, we have that Conflicts(T ) ⊆ BackConflicts(T ). Consequently, if Conflicts(T ) is
specified as a set of foreground conflicts which is backgrounded, then every conflict in
Conflicts(T ) is a foreground conflict which is also a background conflict in BackConflicts(T ),
while in some cases a background conflict may not be a foreground conflict. Thus, if one
works with backgrounded conflicts relations of a foreground defeasible theory, as we will do,
foreground conflicts are not necessary within the domain specification. Foreground conflicts
are nevertheless necessary when specifying conflicts of foreground theories (as per Definition
3.11 below), especially in any setting where such conflicts would not be backgrounded
It is worth recapping our setting on conflicts. We have defined normative conflicts which
are conflicts capturing propositional conflicts, as well as deontic conflicts. A normative
conflict can be a foreground conflict or a background conflict. Foreground conflicts will be
those conflicts which are made explicit when specifying a foreground theory. A backgrounded
conflict relation is one for which all possible normative conflicts are included.
Foreground and background deontic rules may have conflicting heads, and to ensure
correct reasoning patterns, background superiorities can be proposed. We assume that
background rules are inferior to any foreground rules.
Definition 3.9. A superiority relation is a background superiority relation with respect
to a defeasible theory T and a set of background defeasible rule schemata B, denoted
BackSup(T,B), iff BackSup(T,B) = {(s,r) | s ∈ Rules(T ),r ∈ BackRules(T,B)}.
Definition 3.10. A superiority relation is a backgrounded superiority relation with respect
to a defeasible theory T and a set of background defeasible rule schemata B iff =
(T )∪BackSup(T,B).
Example 3 (continued). The background pairs in the superiority relation are as follows.
(r,d vehi) (r,d emer) (r,d enter)
(r,k vehi) (r,k emer) (r,k enter)
(r,d ¬vehi) (r,d ¬emer) (r,d ¬enter)
(r,k ¬vehi) (r,k ¬emer) (r,k ¬enter)

3.2. Deontic defeasible theory and argumentation graphs
We now propose to ‘background’ defeasible theories where rules, conflicts and superiority
relationships are backgrounded with respect to any foreground defeasible theory. A foreground
18
defeasible theory is a defeasible theory where rules are not background rules, i.e. rules whose
identifiers are not identifiers of any background rules.
Definition 3.11. A defeasible theory 〈Rules,Conflicts,〉 is a foreground defeasible theory
iff
• every defeasible rule in Rules is a (foreground) normative defeasible rule which is not a
background defeasible rule, and
• every conflict in Conflicts is a (foreground) normative conflict.
Definition 3.12. A defeasible theory 〈Rules,Conflicts,〉 is a backgrounded defeasible the-
ory of a foreground defeasible theory T with a set of background defeasible rule schemata B
iff
• Rules is a backgrounded set of rules with respect to T and B, and
• Conflicts is a backgrounded conflict relation with respect to T , and
•  is a backgrounded superiority relation with respect to T and B.
In practice, we will first construct a foreground defeasible theory which can be back-
grounded to obtain a backgrounded defeasible theory. In the remainder of the paper, we
assume that any defeasible theory is backgrounded with a permissive set of background
defeasible rule schemata to obtain a permissive defeasible theory.
Definition 3.13. A defeasible theory is a permissive defeasible theory iff it is a backgrounded
defeasible theory with a permissive set of background defeasible rule schemata.
We can build arguments from a backgrounded defeasible theory. When building arguments,
chaining rules implicitly use the detachment of the consequent of rules. In that regard, deontic
studies usually distinguish between factual detachment and deontic detachment. In this
work, we restrict ourselves to factual detachment, leaving (defeasible) deontic detachments
(which are considered somewhat controversial in the literature [37]) to future work. Once
arguments are built we can form an argumentation graph, and then label arguments and
(deontic) statements to determine their statuses, as discussed next.
3.3. Probabilistic labellings
Given a backgrounded defeasible theory and an argumentation graph built from it, we can
now label (deontic) literal statements and associate their acceptance statuses with probability
values.
To label arguments and (deontic) statements, we first consider labelling semantics as
described in Section 2. Hence, given the argumentation graph built from a backgrounded
defeasible theory, arguments are labelled according to the grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-
labelling semantics. Then, literal statements are labelled with acceptance statement labelling
semantics. Such labellings are thus a straightforward application of standard labelling seman-
tics corresponding to some common modes of reasoning.
However, bare {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings are cumbersome in that they allow any ‘doc-
trinal’ arguments, i.e. arguments based on background principles, to be excluded, i.e. labelled
OFF, whereas such doctrinal arguments should always be included as long as the corresponding
background principles are endorsed in the legal system being considered. For this reason, we
may introduce ‘legitimate’ (legit) grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings and legit grounded
probabilistic labelling frames.
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Definition 3.14. Let G be an argumentation graph constructed from a permissive defeasi-
ble theory. A grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling L of G is a legit grounded {IN,OUT,
UND,OFF}-labelling of G iff for any argument A ∈AG:
• if TopRule(A) = d γ and DirectSub(A) = {B} and L(B) 6= OFF then L(A) 6= OFF, and
• if TopRule(A) = p γ or TopRule(A) = k γ then L(A) 6= OFF.
Example 4. Let us consider the following arguments, along with the associated argumenta-
tion graph G drawn in Figure 7. All the legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings of G
are given in Table 1.
O1 : ⇒r Oa O2 : ⇒r′ O¬a
P1 : O1 ⇒d a Pa P2 : O2 ⇒d ¬a P¬a






Figure 7: Argumentation graph G.
O1 O2 P1 P2 W1 W2
OFF OFF OFF OFF IN IN
IN OFF IN OFF IN OUT
OFF IN OFF IN OUT IN
UND UND UND UND UND UND
Table 1: Legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings of argumentation graph G.

Definition 3.15. Let G be an argumentation graph constructed from a permissive defeasible
theory. A grounded PLF 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 is a legit grounded probabilistic labelling frame
iff for any {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling L ∈Ω such that L is not a legit grounded {IN,OUT,
UND,OFF}-labelling, P(L) = 0.
Moving to statement labellings, (legit) grounded probabilistic labelling frames have mul-
tiple properties. Let us mention a few of them. First of all, bivalent {in,ni}-labelling and
trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling semantics imply that two conflicting deontic statements
cannot be simultaneously labelled in: if a deontic statement is labelled in then any con-
flicting statement is labelled ni (in the case of {in,ni}-labellings) or niund (in the case of
{in,und,niund}-labellings), see Proposition 2.1.
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Proposition 3.1. Let L be a grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation
graph constructed from a permissive defeasible theory T , S a set of literal statements such
that S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}.
• Let K be a bivalent {in,ni}-labelling of S and from {L}. For any γ ∈S :
– if K(L,Oγ) = in then K(L,Oγ) = ni;
– if K(L,¬Oγ) = in then K(L,Oγ) = ni;
– if K(L,Oγ) = in then K(L,¬Oγ) = ni.
• Let K be a trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from {L}. For any γ ∈S :
– if K(L,Oγ) = in then K(L,Oγ) = niund;
– if K(L,¬Oγ) = in then K(L,Oγ) = niund;
– if K(L,Oγ) = in then K(L,¬Oγ) = niund.
By Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.1, results in Proposition 3.1 can be understood in our
probabilistic development as follows.
Proposition 3.2. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a grounded PLF where G is constructed from a
permissive defeasible theory T , and S is a set of literal statements such that S = {p,¬p |
p ∈ Prop(T )}.
• In case of bivalent {in,ni}-labellings, for any γ ∈S :
– P(KOγ = ni | KOγ = in) = 1;
– P(KOγ = ni | K¬Oγ = in) = 1;
– P(K¬Oγ = ni | KOγ = in) = 1.
• In case of trivalent {in,und,niund}-labellings, for any γ ∈S :
– P(KOγ = niund | KOγ = in) = 1;
– P(KOγ = niund | K¬Oγ = in) = 1;
– P(K¬Oγ = niund | KOγ = in) = 1.
Proof. Let us provide the proof for the first item only in the case of bivalent {in,ni}-labellings
(proofs for other items follow the same structure). From Proposition 3.1, if K(L,Oγ) = in
then K(L,Oγ) = ni. Therefore, by Proposition 2.2, P(KOγ = ni | KOγ = in) = 1.
Corollary 3.1. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a grounded PLF where G is constructed from a per-
missive defeasible theory T , and S is a set of literal statements such that S = {p,¬p | p ∈
Prop(T )}.
• In case of bivalent {in,ni}-labellings, for any γ ∈S :
– P(KOγ = in)≤ P(KOγ = ni);
– P(K¬Oγ = in)≤ P(KOγ = ni);
– P(KOγ = in)≤ P(K¬Oγ = ni).
• In case of trivalent {in,und,niund}-labellings, for any γ ∈S :
– P(KOγ = in)≤ P(KOγ = niund);
– P(K¬Oγ = in)≤ P(KOγ = niund);
– P(KOγ = in)≤ P(K¬Oγ = niund).
Proof. Let us provide the proof for the first item only in the case of bivalent {in,ni}-labellings
(proofs for other items follow the same structure). From Proposition 3.1, if K(L,Oγ) = in
then K(L,Oγ) = ni. Therefore, by Corollary 2.1, P(KOγ = in)≤ P(KOγ = ni).
On the same note, Proposition 2.3 can be instantiated with deontic statements which are
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inherently conflicting as specified in Definition 3.6. For instance
P(KFγ = in)+P(KOγ = in)≤ 1 (1)
P(KFγ = in)+P(KPγ = in)≤ 1 (2)
and thus by Corollary 2.2 we obtain
P(KOγ = in)≤ P(KFγ = ni) (3)
P(KOγ = in)≤ P(KFγ = niund)+P(KFγ = und). (4)
P(KPγ = in)≤ P(KFγ = ni) (5)
P(KPγ = in)≤ P(KFγ = niund)+P(KFγ = und). (6)
These results are more specific than results given in Corollary 3.1 in the case of trivalent
{in,und,niund}-labellings.
The above results are based on the fact that if a deontic statement is labelled in then any
conflicting statement is labelled ni or niund. Let us now inspect probabilistic relationships
between obligations and permissions. We can first note that if an obligation Oγ is labelled in
then the implied permission ¬Oγ (i.e. Pγ) is also labelled in.
Proposition 3.3. Let L be a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumen-
tation graph constructed from a permissive defeasible theory T , S a set of literal state-
ments such that S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}, and K a bivalent {in,ni}-labelling or triva-
lent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from {L}. For any γ ∈S , if K(L,Oγ) = in then
K(L,¬Oγ) = in.
Proof. Given an argumentation graph G constructed from a permissive defeasible theory, if
K(L,Oγ) = in, then there exist an argument A ∈AG and B ∈AG such that con(A) = Oγ and
B : A⇒d γ Pγ . Let A  ⊆AG be the set of attackers of A, A  ⊆AG the set of arguments
attacked by A, and B ⊆ AG the set of attackers of B. We have that B ⊆ A  ∪A  .
By Definition 2.16, if L(A) = IN then for any argument C ∈ A  ∪A  L(C) = OUT or
L(C)=OFF. Since B ⊆A  ∪A  , for any argument C∈B L(C)=OUT or L(C)=OFF,
and thus L(B) = IN. Therefore, if L(A) = IN then L(B) = IN, and thus if K(L,Oγ) = in then
K(L,Pγ) = in, i.e. if K(L,Oγ) = in then K(L,¬Oγ) = in.
In our probabilistic framework, Proposition 3.3 tells us that for any outcome where Oγ is
labelled in, the implied permission Pγ is also labelled in. Consequently, the probability that
something is permitted given that it is obligatory is one, and the probability that something is
permitted is necessarily greater or equal than the probability that it is obligatory.
Proposition 3.4. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a legit grounded PLF where G is constructed from a
permissive defeasible theory T , and S is a set of literal statements such that S = {p,¬p |
p ∈ Prop(T )}. For any γ ∈S :
P(KPγ = in | KOγ = in) = 1.
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Proof. From Proposition 3.3, if K(L,Oγ) = in then K(L,¬Oγ) = in. By Proposition 2.2
P(KPγ = in | KOγ = in) = 1.
Corollary 3.2. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a legit grounded PLF where G is constructed from a
permissive defeasible theory T , and S is a set of literal statements such that S = {p,¬p |
p ∈ Prop(T )}. For any γ ∈S :
P(KOγ = in)≤ P(KPγ = in).
Proof. From Proposition 3.3, if K(L,Oγ) = in then K(L,¬Oγ) = in. By Corollary 2.1,
P(KOγ = in)≤ P(KPγ = in).
We can also observe that any backgrounded defeasible theory along with a trivalent
labelling semantics leads to a third interpretation of the principle of prohibition in terms of
labelling: if something is not prohibited (the prohibition is labelled niund) then it is permitted
(the permission is labelled in).
Proposition 3.5. Let L be a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation
graph constructed from a permissive defeasible theory T , S a set of literal statements such
that S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}. Let K be a trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and
from {L}. For any γ ∈S : if K(L,Fγ) = niund then K(L,Pγ) = in.
Proof. Given an argumentation graph constructed from a permissive defeasible theory T ,
for any γ ∈S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}, there exists a unique argument W : ∼ Fγ ⇒k γ Pγ .
All attackers of W are arguments whose conclusion is Fγ (i.e. Oγ). If K(L,Oγ) = niund
then all attackers of W are OUT or OFF, and thus W is labelled IN, and Pγ is labelled in.
i.e. K(L,¬Oγ) = in. Therefore, if K(L,Fγ) = niund then K(L,Pγ) = in.
Corollary 3.3. Let L be a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation
graph constructed from a permissive defeasible theory T , and S a set of literal statements
such that S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}. Let K be a trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S
and from {L}. For any γ ∈S , K(L,Fγ) = niund iff K(L,Pγ) = in.
Proof. From Proposition 3.1, if K(L,¬Oγ) = in then K(L,Oγ) = niund, that is, if K(L,Pγ) =
in then K(L,Fγ) = niund. In addition, from Proposition 3.5, if K(L,Fγ) = niund then
K(L,Pγ) = in. Hence, K(L,Fγ) = niund iff K(L,Pγ) = in.
In our probabilistic framework, Corollary 3.3 implies that for any outcome, something is
permitted if, and only if, it is not prohibited. Consequently, the probability that something is
permitted and the probability that it is not prohibited are equal.
Proposition 3.6. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a legit grounded PLF where G is constructed from
a permissive defeasible theory T , S a set of literal statements such that S = {p,¬p | p ∈
Prop(T )}. For any γ ∈S :
P(KFγ = niund) = P(KPγ = in).
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Now, on the basis of legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings, jurists may argue
that bivalent {in,ni}-labellings are not satisfactory. Given an argumentation graph from any
backgrounded defeasible theory (which can contain arguments supporting implicit permissions
due to background rules), it may be the case that all arguments are labelled UND. Consequently,
using a bivalent {in,ni}-labelling, deontic statements Oγ , Fγ and Pγ may be labelled ni. This is
illustrated in Example 4 below, and suggests that bivalent labellings are insufficient to capture
normative completeness. For this reason, we discard bivalent {in,ni}-labelling semantics, and
instead propose trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling semantics to cater for deontic reasoning to
address normative completeness.
Example 4 (continued). Let us consider the legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling













Figure 8: A legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling.
First, naive common sense (bivalent) reasoning can be modelled via the following accep-
tance bivalent {in,ni}-labelling:
〈 /0,{Oa,Pa,O¬a,¬Pa}〉 .
However, this bivalent labelling is problematic from a legal stance because statement a is
here not obligated, permitted or prohibited. To address this gap, we can employ a trivalent
{in,und,niund}-labelling:
〈 /0,{Oa,Pa,O¬a,¬Pa}, /0〉
according to which the deontic status of a is undecided. 
More formally, the definition of normative gaps — which represent statements that are not
permitted, obliged or prohibited — as we may conceive them in terms of statement labellings,
depends on whether bivalent {in,ni}-labellings or trivalent {in,und,niund}-labellings are
employed.
Definition 3.16. Let L be a grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation
graph constructed from a defeasible theory T , and S the set of literal statements such that
S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}.
• Let K denote a bivalent {in,ni}-labelling of S and from {L}. There is a {in,ni}-labelling
normative gap iff there exists a literal statement γ ∈S such that
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K(L,Oγ) = ni and K(L,Oγ) = ni and K(L,¬Oγ) = ni.
• Let K′ denote a trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from {L}. There is a {in,
und,niund}-labelling normative gap iff there exists a literal statement γ ∈S such that
K′(L,Oγ) = niund and K′(L,Oγ) = niund and K′(L,¬Oγ) = niund.
In the case of a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation graph
constructed from a permissive defeasible theory, the definition of gaps may be simplified.
We can remark, for example, that the conjunction in the first item can be simplified into
‘K(L,Oγ) = ni and K(L,¬Oγ) = ni’, because K(L,¬Oγ) = ni implies K(L,Oγ) = ni (by
Proposition 3.3). In some other deontic frameworks, however, these two conjuncts may hold
while K(L,Oγ) = in, suggesting a gap where in fact there is none. Hence, a conjunction
specifying the labelling of the three deontic statuses may appear as a stronger definition of
gaps, and eventually it may be easier to grasp.
In the case of a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation graph
constructed from a permissive defeasible theory, and as illustrated in Example 4, biva-
lent {in,ni}-labellings may lead to {in,ni}-labelling normative gaps, whereas, trivalent
{in,und,niund}-labellings have no normative gaps, i.e. they provide normative completeness.
Theorem 3.1. Let L be a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of an argumentation
graph constructed from a permissive defeasible theory T , S a set of literal statements such
that S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}, and K a trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from
{L}. For any γ ∈S :
K(L,Oγ) 6= niund or K(L,Oγ) 6= niund or K(L,¬Oγ) 6= niund.
Proof. Any trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling K is a total function. Thus, for any γ ∈S ,
there are three cases which must be considered: 1. K(L,Oγ) = in, 2. K(L,Oγ) = und, and
3. K(L,Oγ) = niund. If K(L,Oγ) = niund then K(L,Pγ) = in (Proposition 3.5), and thus in
the last case, K(L,Pγ) = in, i.e. K(L,¬Oγ) = in. Therefore in any case, K(L,Oγ) 6= niund
or K(L,Oγ) 6= niund or K(L,¬Oγ) 6= niund.
Hence, trivalent {in,und,niund}-labellings address normative completeness by means
of the status ‘undecided’ for deontic statements. Eventually, such undecidedness can be
disentangled in various ways, typically by a competent authority such as a judge. The trivalent
labellings make such undecidedness explicit.
In our probabilistic framework, Theorem 3.1 implies that for any outcome there is no
normative gap, and therefore the probability of a normative gap is zero.
Corollary 3.4. Let 〈G,〈Ω,F ,P〉〉 be a legit grounded PLF where G is constructed from a
permissive defeasible theory T , S a set of literal statements such that S = {p,¬p | p ∈
Prop(T )}. For any γ ∈S :
P(KOγ = niund, KFγ = niund, KPγ = niund) = 0.
The results presented above hold for any permissive theory. Consequently, they hold for
any backgrounded defeasible theory of a (foreground) defeasible theory with a prima facie or
Kelsenian permissive set of background defeasible rule schemata. In general, it turns out that
both sets yield the same trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling. To show this result, let us first
introduce some definitions for ease of presentation.
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Definition 3.17. Two arguments A and B are k-equivalent arguments iff
• if A is of the form A : ⇒p γ Pγ then B is of the form B : ∼ Fγ ⇒k γ Pγ , and
• if A is of the form A : A1, . . .An,∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm ⇒r ϕ (r 6= p γ) then B is of the form
B : B1, . . . ,Bn,∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm⇒r ϕ , where Ai and Bi (1≤ i≤ n) are k-equivalent.
Definition 3.18. Argumentation graphs G1 and G2 are k-equivalent argumentation graphs
iff there exists a bijection f : AG1→AG2 such that for any argument A ∈AG1:
• f(A) = B iff A and B are k-equivalent, and
• (A,A′) ∈ G1 iff (f(A), f(A′)) ∈ G2.
Definition 3.19. Let
• G1 and G2 be two argumentation graphs;
• H1 (H2 resp.) be a subargument-complete subgraph of G1 (G2 resp.);
• L1 (L2 resp.) be a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of the argumentation graph
G1 (G2 resp.) with respect to subgraph H1 (H2 resp.);
L1 and L2 are k-equivalent labellings iff G1 and G2 are k-equivalent, and H1 and H2 are
k-equivalent.
The work in [9] showed that both types of permissive theories yield the same trivalent
{in,und,niund}-labelling for {IN,OUT,UND}-labellings. Theorem 3.2 is a generalisation of
this result to grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings.
Theorem 3.2. Let
• T be a (foreground) defeasible theory;
• U be the backgrounded defeasible theory of T with a prima facie permissive set of back-
ground defeasible rule schemata;
• V be the backgrounded defeasible theory of T with a Kelsenian permissive set of background
defeasible rule schemata;
• LU (LV resp.) be a legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of the argumentation graph
constructed from U (V resp.);
• S be a set of literal statements such that S = {p,¬p | p ∈ Prop(T )}, and K a trivalent
{in,und,niund}-labelling of S and from {L}.
For any γ ∈S , if LU and LV are k-equivalent then
K(LU ,γ) = K(LV ,γ) and K(LU ,Oγ) = K(LV ,Oγ) and K(LU ,¬Oγ) = K(LV ,¬Oγ).
Proof. Let GU (GV resp.) denote the argumentation graph constructed from U (V resp.),
and HU (HV resp.) a subgraph of GU (GV resp.) such that LU (LV resp.) the legit grounded
{IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling with respect to HU (HV resp.). If LU and LV are k-equivalent
then GU and GV are k-equivalent, and HU and HV are k-equivalent. By Theorem 3.2 in
[9], for any γ ∈S : K(LU ,γ) = K(LV ,γ) and K(LU ,Oγ) = K(LV ,Oγ) and K(LU ,¬Oγ) =
K(LV ,¬Oγ).
Theorem 3.2 extends representation results to our probabilistic setting. The principle
of prohibition ‘anything that is not prohibited is permitted’ as a schema k γ :∼ Oγ ⇒ Pγ
or a principle such as ‘anything is permitted prima facie’ as a schema p γ : ⇒ Pγ are
two alternatives to cater for normative completeness, and both alternatives lead to the same
results in terms of statement labellings in the case of grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labellings [9].




To illustrate our system, let us reappraise the policy stating that vehicles are forbidden to
enter a park unless there is an emergency. This policy and its associated assumptions may be
formalised in various ways. We illustrate our system with one option which is developed in
the remainder of this section.
4.1. Backgrounded defeasible theory
We assume that there is a vehicle at the entrance of the park, and that there may possibly





r : vehi, ∼ emer⇒ Fenter
The foreground theory can be then backgrounded to yield a backgrounded theory featuring,
amongst others, background rules as exposed in Example 3.
4.2. Argument and argumentation graph construction
Let us consider a Kelsenian permissive set of background defeasible rule schemata.
Accordingly, we can build the following arguments from background rules:
W1 : ∼ Fvehi ⇒k vehi Pvehi W4 : ∼ F¬vehi ⇒k ¬vehi P¬vehi
W2 : ∼ Femer ⇒k emer Pemer W5 : ∼ F¬emer ⇒k ¬emer P¬emer
W3 : ∼ Fenter ⇒k enter Penter W6 : ∼ F¬enter ⇒k ¬enter P¬enter
In addition, we can build the following arguments:
A1 : ⇒rv vehi B1 : ⇒re emer
A2 : A1,∼ emer ⇒r Fenter C1 : ⇒re ¬emer
A3 : A2 ⇒d ¬enter P¬enter
Consequently, we can build the argumentation graph G such that: AG = {A1, A2, A3, B1, C1,
W1, W2, W3, W4, W5, W6}, and G= {(B1,C1),(C1,B1),(B1, A2), (B1,A3), (A2,W3)},
and Z⇒G= {(A1,A2),(A2,A3)} (see Figure 9).
We note that we have built arguments to support weak/doctrinal permissions, thus we can
argue and present full-fledged arguments about such permissions (here arguments W1 . . .W6).
4.3. Argument labelling
The grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling of argumentation graph G is illustrated in Figure 9,
and all legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND, OFF}-labelling outcomes which are deemed possible are
exposed in Table 2.
We assume that the cyber-physical system is such that arguments B1 and C1 cannot
both be labelled OFF, so that it is always indicated whether it is the case that there is an
emergency or no emergency, or whether the case is undecided. We also assume that rule r is
always applied when its antecedents hold. Finally we adopt the principle of indifference on
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all possible legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND, OFF}-labelling outcomes, so that they are equally























Figure 9: Grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling of argumentation graph G.
A1 A2 A3 B1 C1 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 P(·)
OFF OFF OFF IN OFF IN IN IN IN IN IN 1/6
OFF OFF OFF OFF IN IN IN IN IN IN IN 1/6
OFF OFF OFF UND UND IN IN IN IN IN IN 1/6
IN OUT OUT IN OFF IN IN IN IN IN IN 1/6
IN IN IN OFF IN IN IN OUT IN IN IN 1/6
IN UND UND UND UND IN IN UND IN IN IN 1/6
Table 2: Legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings of argumentation graph G with non-zero probabilities.
Given probabilities in Table 2, we can easily see that for example
P(LA3 = IN) = 1/6 (7)
P(LA3 = IN | LB1 = IN) = 0. (8)
In words, the marginal probability that argument A3 is labelled IN is 1/6; and the probability
that argument A3 is labelled IN, given that B1 is labelled IN, is zero.
4.4. Statement labelling
Let L denote the grounded {IN,OUT,UND}-labelling of argumentation graph G, i.e. the
labelling in the last row in Table 2. From this, we can obtain the bivalent {in,ni}-labelling
and trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling as exposed in Table 3.
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vehi ¬vehi emer ¬emer enter ¬enter
K(L, ·) in ni ni ni ni ni
K(L, ·) in niund und und niund niund
Ovehi O¬vehi Oemer O¬emer Oenter O¬enter
K(L, ·) ni ni ni ni ni ni
K(L, ·) niund niund niund niund niund und
Pvehi P¬vehi Pemer P¬emer Penter P¬enter
K(L, ·) in in in in ni in
K(L, ·) in in in in und in
Table 3: Bivalent {in,ni}-labelling and trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling.
We can remark that the {in,ni}-bivalent labelling results in a normative gap (enter is nei-
ther obligatory nor prohibited nor permitted), whereas the trivalent {in,und,niund}-labelling
fills this gap by labelling the permission to enter as undecided.
More generally, for every legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling, we can draw
a statement labelling, and from all the statement labellings we can determine probability
values on the acceptance statuses of statements. For instance, from the argument labelling
probabilities as given in Table 2, we can compute that:
P(Kvehi = in) = 1/2 (9)
P(KFenter = in) = 1/6 (10)
P(KFenter = in | Kvehi = in) = 1/3. (11)
In words, the marginal probability that there is a vehicle is 1/2, and the marginal probability
that there is a detached prohibition from entering the park is 1/6. If it is accepted that there is
a vehicle (a vehicle is perceived), then the probability that the vehicle should not enter is 1/3
(there may be an emergency, or the case is undecided). Such likelihoods may be useful, for
example, in determining whether to monitor specific portions of the system.
4.5. Violation and contrary-to-duty obligation
Let us extend the example with the formalisation of a violation and a contrary-to-duty
obligation. Such obligations can be a pitfall for deontic formalisms which have a more
sophisticated conception of deontic modalities [38, 39], and we would like to illustrate how
such obligations can be handled in our probabilistic deontic argumentation framework.
Let us suppose that the park policy also states that a violation of the prohibition would be
sanctioned by a fine (the amount does not matter for our purposes). To capture such a policy,
we can add the following rules.
v : Fenter, enter⇒ violation v : ⇒¬violation
f : violation⇒ fine f : ⇒¬fine
such that v  v and f  f. Rules v and f specify that, by default, we can derive that there is
neither violation nor fine, unless the contrary is shown.
Furthermore, assume that the park’s management adds the following contrary-to-duty
obligation: if the prohibition is violated then one should stop driving (in the park). We can
thus add the following rule.
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s : violation⇒ Ostop
A sequence of compensatory obligations can be added along similar lines. We also assume
that a vehicle enters in the park:
e : ⇒ enter
In addition to the previous arguments, we can thus build the following arguments (amongst
others).
E1 : ⇒e enter V2 : ⇒v ¬violation
V1 : E1,A2 ⇒r violation F2 : ⇒f ¬fine
F1 : V1 ⇒f fine
A1 A2 A3 B1 C1 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 E1 V1 P(·)
OFF OFF OFF IN OFF IN IN IN IN IN IN OFF OFF 1/9
OFF OFF OFF OFF IN IN IN IN IN IN IN OFF OFF 1/9
OFF OFF OFF UND UND IN IN IN IN IN IN OFF OFF 1/9
IN OUT OUT IN OFF IN IN IN IN IN IN OFF OFF 1/9
IN IN IN OFF IN IN IN OUT IN IN IN OFF OFF 1/9
IN UND UND UND UND IN IN UND IN IN IN OFF OFF 1/9
IN OUT OUT IN OFF IN IN IN IN IN IN IN OUT 1/9
IN IN IN OFF IN IN IN OUT IN IN IN IN IN 1/9
IN UND UND UND UND IN IN UND IN IN IN IN UND 1/9
Table 4: Legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labellings with non-zero probabilities (not all possible arguments are
labelled due to the lack of space).
Again, for every legit grounded {IN,OUT,UND,OFF}-labelling of the resulting argumenta-
tion graph, we can draw a statement labelling, and from all the statement labellings we can
determine probability values on the labellings of statements. For instance, from the argument
labelling probabilities given in Table 4, and assuming that rules v, f, v, f and s apply in all
outcomes where their antecedents hold, and assuming that there is no doubt that a vehicle has
entered in the park, we can compute the following probabilities.
P(Kviolation = in | Kvehi = in) = 1/6 P(Kviolation = in | Kvehi = in,Kenter = in) = 1/3
P(Kfine = in | Kvehi = in) = 1/6 P(Kfine = in | Kvehi = in,Kenter = in) = 1/3
P(KOstop = in | Kvehi = in) = 1/6 P(KOstop = in | Kvehi = in,Kenter = in) = 1/3
In words, if a vehicle is perceived, then a violation, its sanction, and the associated contrary-to-
duty obligation will occur with a probability value 1/6. If, in addition the vehicle has entered
the park, then the probability values increase to 1/3.
5. Conclusion
We have introduced a probabilistic deontic argumentation framework to reason about
probability values attached to deontic statements and arguments supporting these statements.
Given a set of norms and a state of affairs modelled as a defeasible theory, the framework
allows one to associate acceptance statuses of deontic statements and related violations with
probability values, in a principled way.
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To do so, we have combined a deontic argumentation approach where deontic principles
are reified [9] and a probabilistic argumentation approach where argument labellings are
associated with probabilities values [3]. The deontic argumentation composition relies on
common concepts taken from computational models of argument: rule-based arguments,
argumentation graphs, argument labelling semantics and statement labelling semantics. In
this framework, normative completeness is addressed by reifying the principle of prohibition.
This deontic composition is then combined with probabilistic labellings used in probabilistic
argumentation, enabling us to associate statement acceptance statuses with probability values.
We have learnt that the construction of a probabilistic deontic argumentation framework
can be achieved by using standard constructs from computational models of argument and
probabilistic labellings. Then, we could have appreciated that argumentation properties of the
deontic framework can be coupled with probabilistic counterparts, i.e. relationships amongst
acceptance statuses of deontic statements can be understood in meaningful relationships of
probabilities of acceptance statuses of these statements.
Throughout the paper we have identified several potential directions for future research.
In addition, we note that no algorithms to learn or compute probability statuses of arguments
and statements have been considered, and exploring efficient algorithms for this purpose
would be interesting. Finally, throughout the paper, we have avoided relating the probabilistic
framework with possible probability interpretations (such as classical, frequentist, or Bayesian
views on these matters), and thus it may be interesting to investigate the impact of such
interpretations on probabilistic deontic issues.
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